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This article covers cases from 374 S.W.3d through 404 S.W.3d and federal 
cases during the same period that the authors believe are noteworthy to the 
jurisprudence on the applicable subject. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
This survey period continues with trends established during prior periods. 
Tax liens and foreclosure challenges dominate the secured real property arena, 
with cases based on “robo signing” now appearing. Attacks on residential 
foreclosures were plentiful, and the authors have selected the most illuminating 
of these cases to discuss. One court discussed and confused the requirements for 
a valid waiver of notice of intent to accelerate; hopefully, future courts will 
follow the logic set forth herein. Also addressed are cases dealing with recourse 
carve-outs and related procedural issues, and the fair notice doctrine, each of 
which provides good lessons to practitioners. 
In the context of sales, a significant number of cases addressed breach of 
implied warranties and fraud in the inducement. One particular case on fraud 
in the inducement contains a majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions 
concerning the perplexing “as-is” clause, which continues to elude concise 
judicial interpretation and appropriate drafting. Quite a few cases from the 
survey period provide drafting lessons, again addressing disclaimer-of-reliance 
provisions, reverters, and legal descriptions. Easements and public roads also 
found their way into the cases, and the courts revisited causes of action for 
declaratory judgment versus trespass to try title and jurisdiction of the Justice 
Court for suits for possession versus those for title. Finally, the Texas Supreme 
Court dealt with the important issue of a rolling easement along the Texas gulf 
coast and found that there is none if the shoreline change is the result of an 
avulsive event.1 
 
 1. Severance v. Patterson, 370 S.W.3d 705, 724–25 (Tex. 2012). 
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II.  MORTGAGES, LIENS AND FORECLOSURES 
A.  TAX LIENS 
In re Cowin involves a tax lien conspiracy.2 The co-conspirators entered into a 
scheme whereby one co-conspirator would acquire condominium units 
purchased at a homeowners association assessment lien foreclosure sale.3 
Immediately thereafter, ad valorem taxes on the real property were paid by third-
party financing secured by a tax lien transfer and deed of trust.4 The property 
owner defaulted on the tax lien transfer documentation resulting in a tax lien 
foreclosure, with all tax lien foreclosure sale proceeds used to pay expenses, 
satisfy the tax lien debt, and pay the tax lienholder the balance.5 In Cowin, the 
tax lien foreclosure trustee failed to pay any of the proceeds from the tax lien 
sales to the existing first lienholder.6 The tax lien deed of trust had distribution 
provisions providing for distribution of foreclosure proceeds to expenses, tax 
lien debt, any amounts required by law to be paid, and to the grantor, in that 
order.7 
In the subject case, Cowin altered the distribution provisions to exclude 
payments of amounts required by law to be paid.8 Cowin attempted to defend 
this position under Texas Tax Code § 32.06(j), which directs application of 
proceeds from judicial foreclosure of a tax lien to court costs, the judgment 
amount, attorney’s fees awarded in the judgment, and the remaining proceeds to 
holders of liens on the property in the order of their priority.9 Cowin argued 
this statute was inapplicable because the subject tax lien foreclosure was 
pursuant to the contractual non-judicial foreclosure provisions contained in the 
tax lien deed of trust, not a judicial foreclosure contemplated by that statute.10 
The federal court rejected that argument, concluding that the statute covered 
additional provisions for a judicial foreclosure, but did not overturn standard 
Texas foreclosure law requiring application of foreclosure sale proceeds (to the 
extent of excess proceeds) to be paid to inferior lienholders.11 
As an ancillary defense, Cowin alleged that the noteholder had no standing 
because it was not a beneficiary of record on the first lien deed of trust.12 In each 
of the three properties covered in this opinion, the original deed of trust recited 
the beneficiary as Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), as 
nominee for the actual noteholder.13 Subsequent assignments of each deed of 
trust were made without recordation in the applicable county’s real property 
 
 2. In re Cowin, 492 B.R. 858, 867 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2013). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 874–75. 
 7. Id. at 875. 
 8. Id. at 875–76. 
 9. Id. at 894 (citing TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 32.06(j) (West 2005)). 
 10. Id. at 895. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 871–73. 
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records, although such assignments were noted and recorded with MERS.14 
Cowin alleged that each noteholder had no standing since it had not complied 
with the statutory requirement to the transfer or assignment of a deed of trust 
pursuant to the Texas Local Government Code.15 The court noted numerous 
prior cases holding that the failure to record does not affect the validity of the 
assigned deed of trust.16 Those cases dealt with the original homeowner and 
original lender, but in this case, neither the original owner nor the original 
lender was involved; all parties were either an assignee lender or owner, making 
this a case of first impression (as to assignee lenders and owners).17 Analyzing 
this issue, the court noted that in In re Perry18 the focus was on whether the 
claimant had a duty of inquiry regarding the deed of trust, with the conclusion 
that the recorded deed of trust put a bona fide purchaser on inquiry notice as to 
the status of the recorded deed of trust.19 Consequently, this court concluded 
the concept of inquiry notice was equally applicable to third parties to an 
assigned deed of trust; therefore, notwithstanding the statutory provision, a 
person is under a duty to inquire further about assignments of a deed of trust.20 
B.  WAIVER 
Richardson v. Wells Fargo Bank addressed the issue of waiver of rights in a case 
that involved a residential property foreclosure.21 Richardson obtained a 
residential property loan from Fannie Mae, which Wells Fargo serviced.22 
Richardson defaulted in the mortgage payments and after communications 
between the parties, Wells Fargo offered “temporary trial modification payment 
plan” under a program known as the Home Affordable Mortgage Program 
(HAMP Plan).23 Documentation covering the HAMP Plan provided for trial 
monthly payments and that payments under the HAMP Plan would not be a 
waiver of acceleration of the loan or foreclosure action and would not constitute 
a cure of the mortgage default.24 Richardson made the trial payments, but did 
not cure the existing defaults as required under the HAMP Plan.25 Richardson 
continued to make monthly payments, and the parties communicated regarding 
a permanent modification until June 3, 2010, when Wells Fargo notified 
Richardson that she did not qualify for a permanent HAMP Plan 
modification.26 Nevertheless, on August 4, 2010, Wells Fargo issued a letter 
offering a special forbearance plan (Forbearance Plan), which specified that 
 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 888 (citing TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 192.007(a) (West 2008)). 
 16. Id. at 889. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Hill vs. U.S. Bank, N.A. (In re Perry), No. 11-35205, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 534 (Bankr. S.D. 
Tex. Feb. 8, 2013). 
 19. In re Cowin, 492 B.R. at 889. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Richardson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 873 F. Supp. 2d 800, 805–06 (N.D. Tex. 2012). 
 22. Id. at 806. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 807. 
 26. Id. 
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performance would not bring the loan contractually current, that it would not 
obligate the lender to enter into a further agreement, that it did not constitute a 
waiver of the lender’s rights to insist upon strict performance in the future, that 
all provisions of the note and deed of trust continued in full force and effect, 
and that failure to comply with the Forbearance Plan would render the 
forbearance null and void.27 Richardson failed to execute and return a copy of 
the Forbearance Plan but did make the initial payment thereunder, which 
caused Wells Fargo to suspend the pending foreclosure sale.28 Upon 
Richardson’s failure to make additional payments, Wells Fargo commenced and 
completed the foreclosure process.29 
Richardson alleged that Wells Fargo waived its right to accelerate and 
foreclose by reason of its actions.30 The standard rule to prove waiver requires a 
showing of (1) an existing right, benefit, or advantage; (2) actual or constructive 
knowledge of its existence; and (3) an actual intent to relinquish the right (which 
can be inferred from conduct).31 However, to prove waiver based on an 
inference from Wells Fargo’s conduct, the court noted that Richardson had the 
onerous burden to produce conclusive evidence that Wells Fargo unequivocally 
manifested its intent to no longer assert its claim.32 Richardson asserted waiver 
based on the following facts: (1) Wells Fargo proceeded with foreclosure even 
though Richardson had not missed a payment under the HAMP Plan; (2) Wells 
Fargo advised Richardson it would not foreclose during the existence of a formal 
loan modification plan; (3) Richardson had made the first payment under the 
Forbearance Plan; (4) Wells Fargo did not notify Richardson that her only 
payment under the Forbearance Plan had been returned for insufficient funds; 
(5) Wells Fargo had forwarded a permanent loan modification agreement (based 
on Richardson’s request, but which Richardson failed to sign and return); and 
(6) Wells Fargo acknowledged the foreclosure sale was due to a servicer’s error.33 
The court summarily rejected each of Richardson’s arguments, holding that they 
could not be construed as an unequivocal manifestation of an intent not to 
assert its claim.34 In support, the court observed that Wells Fargo repeatedly 
asserted its intent to maintain its right to accelerate and foreclose, and 
specifically noted such provisions in the note, deed of trust, HAMP Plan, and 
Forbearance Plan.35 This case is instructive to practitioners to be diligent in all 
correspondence and documentation as to whether the lender is waiving or 
 
 27. Id. at 807–08. 
 28. Id. at 808. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 810. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. The note provided that if during a default full payment was not required, the holder 
would “still have the right to [accelerate] if [maker is] in default at a later time”; the deed of trust 
provided that any forbearance in exercising rights and remedies or acceptance of partial payments 
“shall not be a waiver of or preclude the exercise of any right or remedy”; the HAMP Plan stated 
that acceptance of payments during the trial period “will not be deemed a waiver of the acceleration 
. . . or foreclosure action”; and the Forbearance Plan stated that it “shall not constitute a waiver of 
the lender’s right to insist upon strict performance in the future.” Id. 
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preserving its rights and remedies in connection with any intervening workout 
attempts on a defaulted loan. 
C.  ROBO SIGNING 
Over the last five or so years, there have been countless number of claims 
based on “robo signing,” a phrase adopted by the media.36 In general, these cases 
involve the signing of mortgage foreclosure documents and assignments of 
underlying mortgage instruments by a person not technically authorized by 
appropriate formalities to execute such documents.37 Such signatory was 
colloquially denominated as a “robo signer.”38 Such “robo signing” was present 
in Marsh v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.39 Marsh was selected for this presentation 
for two reasons: first, it exemplifies the thousands of similar cases relating to the 
“robo signing,” and second, it addresses an issue of first impression related to 
the creation of fraudulent liens.40 In this case, Marsh acquired residential real 
estate, financing it with the execution of a note payable to MIT Lending secured 
by a deed of trust in favor of “Mortgage Electronic Regulation Systems, Inc., as 
Nominee for Lender and Lender’s Successors and Assigns.”41 Subsequently, 
Mortgage Electronic Regulation Systems, Inc. (MERS) assigned the note and 
deed of trust to Bank of America, as trustee, for servicing.42 Christina 
Trowbridge (the “robo signer”) executed the assignment, as an authorized 
signatory for MERS; however, MERS never authorized this person to execute 
such conveyance.43 Upon an attempted foreclosure, Marsh sued in state court to 
enjoin the foreclosure, and the lender removed to the federal court,44 which is 
the typical procedure in these cases. 
The court concluded that Marsh did not have standing to attack such 
assignment based on the assignment signatory’s alleged lack of authority because 
Marsh was not a party to the assignment between MERS and Bank of America 
as trustee, citing numerous published and unpublished cases from Texas 
consistent with that holding.45 Since the deed of trust clearly identified MERS as 
the nominee for the original lender, the court concluded MERS was a 
mortgagee under the Texas Property Code46 and therefore could authorize Bank 
of America, as trustee, to service and foreclose the loan regardless of whether 
 
 36. Jacob L. White, “Robo-Signing”: A Symptom of the Shortcomings in Maryland’s Policy of 
Expediting Foreclosure Proceedings, 1 U. BALT. J. LAND & DEV. 81, 81–82 (2011). 
 37. Id. at 86–87. 
 38. See id. 
 39. Marsh v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 888 F. Supp. 2d 805, 810 (W.D. Tex. 2012). 
 40. Id. at 810, 813; see also TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 51.903(a) (West 2013) (addresses 
fraudulent liens). 
 41. Marsh, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 810. 
 42. Id. at 807. 
 43. Id. at 808. 
 44. Id. at 807. 
 45. Id. at 809; but see the holding in Miller v. Homecomings Financial discussed in Section II.D., 
which concludes that a debtor/mortgagor has standing to challenge the authority or right of the 
foreclosing mortgagee. 
 46. Marsh, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 811. The court failed to specify the provision of the Texas 
Property Code to which it referred, but this author believes that it would be TEX. PROP. CODE 
ANN. § 53.025 (West 2013). 
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MERS was the true owner of the note.47 
Marsh also contended that the assignment was a fraudulent document within 
the meaning of Texas Government Code § 51.901(c),48 but the court 
determined that Marsh lacked standing to allege the fraudulent lien claim 
because Marsh was not a party to the assignment.49 Nevertheless, the court 
proceeded to analyze Section 51.903(a) of the Texas Government Code as well 
as Section 12.002(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which 
prevents a person from making or recording a document with knowledge that 
the document is a fraudulent lien or claim against real property.50 Two federal 
cases had conflicting decisions and there were no Texas state courts which had 
yet considered the issue of “whether an assignment of a note and deed of trust 
can constitute a lien under chapter 12 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies 
Code.”51 In Garcia v. Bank of New York Mellon, a lien was considered a claim in 
property for payment of a debt secured by a security interest, and the court held 
that chapter 12 did not govern the assignment.52 On the other hand, Kingman 
Holdings, LLC v. CitiMortgage, Inc. suggested that an assignment of a deed of trust 
may constitute a “lien” under chapter 12 in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion53 to dismiss.54 In its analysis, the Marsh court looked at the plain and 
common meaning of the statute’s words and the Texas legislative history.55 The 
plain and common meaning of the statute’s words lead to the conclusion that 
the Texas legislature did not intend to address mortgage assignments in chapter 
12 since “[t]he assignment or transfer of an interest in property is distinct from a 
‘claim’ in property.”56 Further, the court found legislative history indicating the 
purpose of the statute was to “create a private cause of action against a person 
who files fraudulent judgment liens or fraudulent documents purporting to 
create [as opposed to assign] a lien or claim against real . . . property.”57 
Consequently, the court concluded that a cause of action under Section 12.002 
of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code must challenge the lien 
instrument directly and not an assignment of the lien.58 
D.  STANDING—ASSIGNMENT OF MORTGAGE 
Miller v. Homecomings Financial concerns a challenge on the chain of title for 
assignments of a mortgage on residential real property securing a home equity 
 
 47. Id. at 811; see also infra text accompanying notes 12–20 (discussion of similar issue in 
Cowin). 
 48. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 51.901(c) (West 2013). 
 49. Marsh, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 811. 
 50. Id. at 812–14 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 12.002(a) (West 2012)). 
 51. Marsh, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 813. 
 52. Garcia v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. 3:12-CV-0062-D, 2012 WL 692099, at *1 (N. D. Tex. 
Mar. 5, 2012). 
 53. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 54. Kingman Holding, LLC v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 4:10-CV-619, 2011 WL 1883829, at 
*4–6 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 21, 2011). 
 55. Marsh, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 813. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
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loan.59 The court’s opinion is well-reasoned, concise, and authoritative, pointing 
out fallacies in numerous other federal court cases.60 The facts in Miller follow 
the typical factual context: the debtor obtains a residential home loan with a 
lender; the mortgage debt is assigned one or more times to the foreclosing 
lender; the debtor challenges the foreclosure in a state court proceeding; and the 
foreclosing lender removes the case to federal court based on diversity 
jurisdiction.61 Miller’s home equity loan was from Homecomings Financial 
Network, Inc.62 Upon default, Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company 
initiated foreclosure proceedings, as the assignee of the deed of trust from 
JPMorgan Chase Bank as trustee.63 There was no evidence reflecting an 
assignment from Homecomings Financial Network, Inc. to any of the defendant 
lenders, including JPMorgan Chase Bank as trustee or Bank of New York 
Mellon Trust Company.64 
Miller challenged the pending foreclosure because a proper chain of title to 
the note and deed of trust could not be shown.65 The lenders challenged the 
standing of Miller to contest the assignment because Miller was not a party to 
such documents and no cognizable legal theory supported their lack of authority 
to foreclose.66 The court began by discussing the cognizable legal claim, citing 
numerous Texas cases recognizing a debtor’s right to challenge a wrongful 
foreclosure.67 The court concluded that the only party with standing to initiate a 
non-judicial foreclosure sale is the mortgagee or mortgage servicer acting on 
behalf of the current mortgagee.68 If the foreclosing mortgagee is not the original 
mortgagee named in the deed of trust, then factual issues may arise as to the 
authority of such foreclosing party, who must be able to verify its chain of title 
back to the original mortgagee.69 
Status as an appropriate mortgagee for foreclosure can be established in one 
of two ways.70 First, the party can prove “it is the ‘holder’ of the note secured by 
the deed of trust.”71 The holder of a negotiable instrument can be shown by 
proof that the party is the payee or a holder by negotiation with a transfer of 
physical possession of the note.72 “[N]egotiation requires both the transfer of 
possession and written indorsement by the holder.”73 Therefore, a party other 
 
 59. Miller v. Homecomings Fin., 881 F. Supp. 2d 825 (S.D. Tex. 2012). 
 60. See id. at 825–33. 
 61. See id. at 827. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 828, 831. 
 67. Id. at 828 (citing League City State Bank v. Mares, 427 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. Civ. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Martin v. New Century Mortgage Co., 377 S.W.3d 79, 
81–82 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Ballestas, 355 
S.W.3d 187, 189–90 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.); Leavings v. Mills, 175 S.W.3d 
301, 306 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.)). 
 68. Id. at 828 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.001(4) (West 2013)). 
 69. Id. at 829. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
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than the original payee of a note “must prove ‘successive transfers of possession 
and indorsement’ establishing an ‘unbroken chain of title.’”74 The second 
method of establishing appropriate mortgagee status is to prove the “party is the 
‘owner’ of the note under common law principles of assignment.”75 In 
conclusion, the court held that “[a]s a matter of Texas law, . . . homeowners such 
as the Millers do have a cognizable cause of action to challenge a party’s right to 
foreclosure on their property.”76 Consequently, the court concluded that the 
ubiquitous “show me the note” defense is only partially correct in that being the 
holder of the “original note is only one way to establish the right to foreclose, 
but it is not the only way.”77 The court approved Miller’s contention that the 
lenders must show a proper chain of title to the deed of trust.78 Traditionally, 
this is proven by chain of title pursuant to instruments filed in the real property 
records.79 The court noted that “[t]he Texas Property Code provides that ‘if the 
security instrument has been assigned of record, the last person to whom the 
security interest has been assigned of record’ is the mortgagee.”80 
Furthermore, the court recognized the Texas statute requiring “that any 
transfer or assignments of recorded mortgages must also be recorded in the 
office of the county clerk.”81 The court declared that Texas Local Government 
Code § 192.007(a) has not been interpreted, citing Dallas County v. MERSCorp, 
Inc.82 Consequently, the court noted that the gap in the chain of title of 
assignments was sufficient to entitle the homeowner to injunctive relief against 
the threatened foreclosure.83 
Next, the defendant lenders challenged the plaintiffs’ standing because they 
were not parties to the assignment.84 Although the lenders cited numerous 
federal district cases disallowing standing, the court totally emasculated those 
prior decisions by indicating that six were issued by the same magistrate judge, 
none cited any Texas case law or statute, and all but one of the cases relied upon 
a single federal case, Eskridge v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp.,85 which cited 
no state or federal authority.86 On the other hand, the court noted Texas courts 
have “long followed the common law rule which permits a debtor to assert 
 
 74. Id. (citing Leavings v. Mills, 175 S.W.3d 301, 310 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no 
pet.)). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 829–30. 
 77. Id. at 830. 
 78. Id. at 830–31. 
 79. Id. at 830. 
 80. Id. (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.001(4)(C) (West 2013)). 
 81. Id. (discussing TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 192.007(a) (West 2013) (In relevant part, 
this statute reads: “To . . . assign . . . an instrument that is . . . recorded in the office of the county 
clerk, a person must . . . record another instrument relating to the action in the same manner as 
the original instrument is required to be . . . recorded.”)). 
 82. Id. (citing Dallas County v. MERSCorp., Inc., 11-CV-2733, 2013 WL 5903300 (N.D. Tex. 
Nov. 4, 2013)). 
 83. Id. at 830–31. 
 84. Id. at 831. 
 85. Id. (citing Eskridge v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 2011 WL 2163989, at *5 (W.D. Tex. 
Feb. 28, 2011). 
 86. Id. 
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against an assignee any ground that renders the assignment void or invalid.”87 
Further, the court looked to Corpus Juris Secundum and American Jurisprudence in 
support of such general rule of law.88 The only exception to this general rule 
related to “voidable” defenses, not applicable in the current case.89 Further, the 
court cited federal district court cases that allowed chain of title challenges to 
foreclosures.90 In support of this, the court noted the rationale that a debtor 
could be subject to foreclosure of its property by one foreclosing creditor, while 
at the same time being liable on a debt in the hands of another creditor.91 
Therefore, to avoid the double jeopardy, the chain of title must be proven from 
the original owner and holder of the note and deed of trust to the current 
foreclosing lender.92 Thus, “under Texas law homeowners have legal standing to 
challenge the validity or effectiveness of any assignment or chain of assignments 
under which a party claims the right to foreclose on their property.”93 
E.  RULE 736 FORECLOSURE 
Wells Fargo Bank v. Robinson deals with foreclosure of a home equity loan 
made pursuant to the Texas Constitution and pursuant to an expedited 
foreclosure under Rule 736 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.94 In Robinson, 
the home equity loan was in default, and Wells Fargo proceeded with an 
application for court approval of the foreclosure.95 The parties ultimately 
reached an agreement allowing Robinson an additional time period to sell the 
house, and the trial court signed an order under Rule 736 stating that Wells 
Fargo was authorized to proceed with foreclosure, to post the property before 
April 14, 2008, and foreclose on May 6, 2008.96 However, Wells Fargo did not 
post until May 12, 2008 and conducted a foreclosure on June 3, 2008.97 The 
court held that the court order did not authorize Wells Fargo to foreclose on a 
date other than the date specified in the court order, and therefore, it 
wrongfully foreclosed.98 In support, the court analyzed the applicable provisions 
of the Texas Constitution, which includes a requirement that the lien of a home 
equity loan may be foreclosed upon only by court order.99 By violating the court 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. (citing 6A C.J.S. Assignment § 132 (May 2012)); 6 Am. Jur. 2d Assignment § 119 (May 
2012)). 
 89. Id. at 831–32. 
 90. Id. at 832 (citing Millet v. JPMorgan Chase, N.A., No. SA-11-CV-1031-XR, 2012 WL 
1029497, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2012); Norwood v. Chase Home Finance LLC, No. A-09-CA-
940-JRN, 2011 WL 197874 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 19, 2011)). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id.; but see TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.0001(4) (West Supp. 2013) (defining a proper 
“mortgagee” for foreclosure only in terms of being the holder of a security instrument with no 
mention of a note). 
 93. Miller, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 832. 
 94. Wells Fargo Bank v. Robinson, 391 S.W.3d 590, 592–95 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no 
pet.). 
 95. Id. at 592–93. 
 96. Id. at 593. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6). 
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order in deferring the foreclosure for a month, Wells Fargo wrongfully 
foreclosed.100 Practitioners should take note of this narrow holding and seek 
court orders under Rule 736 proceedings to allow for foreclosure on a specified 
date or within some period thereafter. 
F.  EXECUTION DEED 
Mosby v. Post Oak Bank involved a dispute between a deed of trust lien 
foreclosure purchaser and an execution sale purchaser.101 Post Oak Bank held a 
deed of trust executed by Tinmore and filed on April 17, 2007.102 Judgment was 
rendered in favor of Morrell Masonry against Tinmore on September 30, 2008 
with a writ of execution and order of sale issued on December 9, 2008.103 The 
execution sale occurred on February 3, 2009, pursuant to which Mosby acquired 
the subject property.104 An execution deed was recorded on March 18, 2009, 
conveying to Mosby all of the right, title, and interest of the judgment debtor 
Tinmore.105 Post Oak Bank ultimately foreclosed on its deed of trust lien on 
June 2, 2009, setting up the dispute between the bank as the deed of trust 
foreclosure purchaser and Mosby as the execution sale purchaser.106 In what the 
court described as a case of first impression, the court addressed the meaning of 
the execution section under the Texas Property Code.107 This statute provides 
that the “conveyance of real property by an officer legally authorized to sell the 
property . . . passes absolute title to the property to the purchaser.”108 Mosby 
relied on the “absolute title” language by asserting that it extinguished the prior 
deed of trust lien held by Post Oak Bank.109 The court rejected this contention, 
noting that subsection (a) of the statute excludes any affect against a person who 
does not claim under a party to the conveyance or judgment.110 In this case, Post 
Oak Bank was neither a party to the conveyance by the execution deed nor a 
party to the original judgment.111 Additionally, the court noted that the 
execution deed only conveyed “whatever interest Tinmore . . . had in the 
[p]roperty.”112 Consequently, the execution sale under the statute did not affect 
the superior lien position of Post Oak Bank.113 
 
 100. Robinson, 391 S.W.3d at 593. 
 101. Mosby v. Post Oak Bank, 401 S.W.3d 183, 185 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, 
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III.  DEBTOR/CREDITOR 
A.  INSURANCE ESCROWS 
Garcia v. Bank of America Corp. deals with insurance placed by the lender 
when the borrower failed to obtain insurance for the mortgaged property.114 
Garcia, as the homeowner, obtained a loan and executed a deed of trust that 
contained a typical insurance escrow provision requiring Garcia to maintain 
insurance sufficient to protect the mortgagee’s interest in the property; however, 
if Garcia failed to provide such insurance, the mortgage authorized the 
mortgagee to purchase insurance for the property, but it did not require 
mortgagee to protect the homeowner’s interest in the property.115 After the 
court concluded that Garcia was not a third party beneficiary under the forced 
placed insurance, it addressed issues of good faith and fair dealing, and the 
fiduciary duty of the lender to renew the homeowner’s insurance policy and use 
the escrow account funds for payment of the insurance premiums.116 As to the 
duty of good faith and fair dealing, the escrow provisions in Garcia’s mortgage 
did not create a special relationship and, therefore, created no duty of good faith 
and fair dealing.117 
On the issue of fiduciary duty, the language of the mortgage proved 
instrumental in that it required the lender to use funds in the escrow account to 
pay insurance premiums, but it did not require the lender to obtain a renewal of 
the insurance policy, which was an obligation of the homeowner.118 
Consequently, since Garcia allowed the insurance policy to lapse without 
furnishing a renewal invoice to the lender for payment of the premium, the 
lender had no duty to affirmatively seek out a renewal of the homeowner’s 
insurance policy and pay the premiums using funds from the insurance escrow 
account.119 Practitioners should be certain that escrow provisions in their 
documents clearly establish the distinction between the duty to obtain or renew 
the insurance as opposed to the mere payment of the premiums when an invoice 
is presented. 
B.  DEFICIENCY LAWSUIT 
In a deficiency lawsuit following foreclosure, Preston Reserve, L.L.C. v. Compass 
Bank demonstrates clearly what a lender should not do.120 Preston Reserve 
owned land upon which there was a debt at the time of foreclosure of $2.4 
million, which was guaranteed by Howe.121 The lender foreclosed and bid $1.2 
 
 114. Garcia v. Bank of America Corp., 375 S.W.3d 322, 324 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 
2012, no pet.). 
 115. See id. 
 116. Id. at 326–34. 
 117. Id. at 332. 
 118. Id. at 334. 
 119. Id. at 334–35. 
 120. See Preston Reserve, L.L.C. v. Compass Bank, 373 S.W.3d 652, 656 (Tex. App.—Houston 
[14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.). 
 121. Id. 
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million, leaving a deficiency.122 Upon suit for the deficiency amount, the parties 
had to present evidence of the fair market value of the property.123 During trial, 
Howe testified as an expert witness that the value of the property was $2.7 
million; however, the lender did not introduce any expert opinion testimony as 
to the fair market value of the property, relying upon the Property Owner Rule 
to allow one of its corporate officers to testify as to fair market value.124 In this 
case, the lender’s workout loan officer, Scott, testified that his experience 
included the foreclosure on real estate collateral and the reselling of over 5,000 
properties after foreclosure.125 Based on this testimony, the court deemed Scott 
an officer with a managerial position and duties related to the property, making 
him a proper party to testify under the Property Owner Rule.126 
However, as to his opinion on fair market value of the property, Scott 
testified that his opinion was based upon (1) offers received, (2) information 
provided by internal and external valuation experts, (3) zoning for the property, 
(4) plat deadlines for development, (5) a flood plain determination, and (6) 
availability of financing for raw land.127 The Property Owner Rule requires that 
the witness must testify as to his personal familiarity with the property and its 
fair market value, and that if such officer or employee lacks personal knowledge, 
then his testimony does not constitute evidence under the Property Owner 
Rule.128 Consequently, the court concluded that the factors considered by Scott 
did not “demonstrate Scott’s personal familiarity with the property’s value and 
knowledge of the market at the time of the foreclosure sale.”129 However, there 
is a dissenting opinion that finds the knowledge of each of these factors to be 
evidence of personal familiarity with the property and its fair market value.130 
Also, additional information presented at trial on the property’s fair market 
value was deemed no evidence and could not support the trial court’s 
judgment.131 The first was the foreclosure sale bid price.132 Texas law is clear that 
a foreclosure sale bid does not constitute fair market value.133 Under Texas law, 
fair market value is “the price the property will bring when offered for sale by 
one who desires to sell, but is not obliged to sell, and is bought by one who 
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 123. Id. (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.003(b) (West 2010) (providing, in relevant part, 
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 130. Id. at 671 (McCally, J., dissenting). 
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desires to buy, but is under no necessity of buying.”134 Second, evidence of the 
property’s resale price a year after foreclosure was not deemed competent 
evidence because the record did not include evidence of whether the sale was 
out of the ordinary, how the property was marketed, and whether market 
conditions were comparable to the time of the foreclosure sale.135 Third, an 
unaccepted offer presented to the bank two weeks after the foreclosure sale was 
not competent evidence since unaccepted offers to purchase property are not 
evidence of the market value of the property.136 The court concluded that since 
there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding of a fair 
market value of $2.4 million, and since the only legally sufficient evidence was 
that of Howe’s testimony of a $2.7 million value, the summary judgment could 
not be sustained and was reversed.137 
This case should be instructive to practitioners on proving the fair market 
value of a property. However, this author finds the position of the dissenting 
opinion on the “personal familiarity” of the witness to be more persuasive.138 
Hopefully, this can be reconsidered and clarified in future decisions, but in the 
interim, practitioners should be mindful of the majority view in this case. 
C.  FRAUDULENT TRANSFER 
Basley v. Adoni Holdings addressed a fraudulent transfer issue.139 Dodeka 
obtained an $8,614.64 judgment against Whitt for a credit card debt.140 
Eventually, Dodeka discovered a house owned by Whitt and obtained a writ of 
execution.141 On February 2, 2010, a constable sale was conducted, and the 
property was sold for $4,442.43 to Adoni.142 On February 18, 2010, before the 
constable’s deed to Adoni was recorded, Whitt signed a general warranty deed 
conveying the property to her niece, her sister, and her brother, who promptly 
recorded the deed.143 Upon discovering the Whitt conveyance, Dodeka brought 
an action alleging fraudulent transfer under the Fraudulent Transfer Act.144 On 
appeal, the issue was whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to 
establish a fraudulent transfer.145 At trial, Whitt summarized her assets as 
including her home (subject to a mortgage), her automobiles, personal property, 
 
 134. Id. at 658 (citing Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 246 (Tex. 1981)). 
 135. Id. at 663. 
 136. Id. at 664 (citing Lee v. Lee, 47 S.W.3d 767 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. 
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 140. Id. at 581. 
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and a bank account.146 However, Dodeka’s counsel never asked about the 
balance of the bank account and did not establish evidence of her assets at the 
time of transfer, as opposed to the time of trial.147 Consequently, the court 
determined that the creditor had the burden to establish the amount and nature 
of Whitt’s assets and liabilities at the time of the transfer but failed to establish 
either.148 
Failing this, the creditor argued a presumption of insolvency under the 
Fraudulent Transfer Act due to the debtor generally not paying debts as they 
came due.149 Evidence established that Whitt had not paid the judgment and 
was delinquent in ad valorem taxes on the property, but there was no further 
evidence of Whitt’s debt and payment status.150 The court found this to 
establish a mere suspicion, which was less than a scintilla of evidence, and 
accordingly, was insufficient to support a conclusion of insolvency.151 In 
support, the court noted the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA) 
comments as to whether a debtor was genuinely paying its debts as they became 
due.152 The list of factors under the UFTA were the amount of debt, due date of 
the debts, number of debts, proportion of debts not being paid, duration of the 
nonpayment, existence of bona fide disputes, and other special circumstances, as 
well as consideration of the debtor’s payment practices and the payment 
practices of the debtor’s trade or industry.153 Since the creditor in Basley failed to 
establish anything other than the credit card debt and the delinquency in ad 
valorem taxes, the court held that it was insufficient evidence to support a 
conclusion that Whitt was insolvent.154 While this case does not present any 
unique principal, it is informative to practitioners as to the details needed to 
establish a debtor’s insolvency at the time of an alleged fraudulent transfer. 
D.  USURY CURE 
In Lagow v. Hamon ex rel. Roach, the court addressed the cure by a lender of a 
usury claim under the Texas Finance Code.155 Lagow obtained a loan from 
Hamon and ultimately defaulted. When Hamon filed suit to collect, Lagow 
counterclaimed for usury.156 Hamon responded with a general denial and a plea 
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in abatement, which the trial court granted.157 Later on the same day, Hamon 
filed two motions for summary judgment.158 Lagow asserted that Hamon had 
waived the right to correct the usury violation by filing the motions for summary 
judgment.159 First, Lagow argued that the applicable provisions of the Texas 
Finance Code were similar to provisions in the Texas Deceptive Trade 
Practices—Consumer Protection Act, which required the plea in abatement at 
the time of filing an answer or very soon thereafter.160 The court distinguished 
the Deceptive Trade Practices Act from the Texas Finance Code on the basis 
that the usury statute is considered penal in nature and that the Texas Supreme 
Court has held the Deceptive Trade Practices Act to be non-penal in nature.161 
Since the usury statute is penal in nature, the court must construe that section 
leniently as to the creditor.162 Consequently, the prompt plea in abatement 
requirement under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act is not applicable to the 
usury penalty provisions under the Texas Finance Code.163 Further, the court 
determined that Hamon’s motion for continuance was not a de facto abatement 
since the motion for continuance related solely to additional time for discovery 
and exploration of settlement and mediation, but it did not include any facts for 
which a plea in abatement would be applicable.164 
Furthermore, Lagow asserted the summary judgment motions constituted a 
waiver of the abatement rights.165 In this regard, the court noted that although 
Hamon filed the plea in abatement and motions for summary judgment 
contemporaneously, Hamon did not file them in the alternative.166 However, in 
the hearing on the plea in abatement, the creditor’s council stated that the 
motions for summary judgment were “contingent on how the [trial] court rules 
on the plea in abatement.”167 Consequently, the court concluded that Hamon 
did not waive a plea in abatement.168 
The facts showed that Hamon, within the applicable sixty day period, 
provided notice to Lagow of a correction in the interest rate charged and offered 
to pay all of Lagow’s legal fees related to the usury defense.169 The trial court 
ordered that the attorney’s fees awarded to Lagow on her usury counterclaim 
would be offset against the amounts owed to Hamon under the promissory 
notes.170 Hamon alleged that this was error, and the court reviewed the 
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applicable provisions of the Texas Finance Code.171 The court noted that the 
plain language of the statutory provisions did not direct how attorney’s fees 
should be paid.172 Accordingly, the court concluded that the trial court did not 
err by ordering the attorney’s fees to be offset against amounts owed under the 
promissory note.173 This case presents a valuable lesson in the procedural aspects 
of curing a usury claim. 
E.  NOTICE OF INTENT TO ACCELERATE 
Mathis v. DCR Mortgage III SUB I, L.L.C. involved a suit on a promissory note 
and construction of the waiver of notice of intent to accelerate.174 Mathis 
executed a note and deed of trust in favor of DCR Mortgage.175 The note 
included a fairly standard waiver provision providing: “except as expressly 
provided herein, [maker] waives all notices (including, without limitation, notice 
of intent to accelerate [and] notice of acceleration).”176 However, the deed of 
trust provided in the default provisions: “If grantor defaults on the note . . . and 
the default continues after [lender] gives [grantor] notice of the default and the 
time within which it must be cured . . ., then [lender] may . . . declare the 
unpaid principal balance and earned interest on the note immediately due.”177 
The facts disclosed that Mathis was perennially late in making payments and 
that DCR did not issue a separate notice letter regarding its intent to 
accelerate.178 The issue on appeal was whether the note and deed of trust, read 
together, were effective to waive the obligation of the lender to give a notice of 
intent to accelerate.179 The court acknowledged that a provision waiving a notice 
of intent to accelerate, whether contained in a note or deed of trust, is effective 
as long as the waiver is clear and unequivocal.180 However, since the note and 
deed of trust were signed concurrently, both documents must be read together, 
and the note and deed of trust did not demonstrate a clear and unequivocal 
waiver of the right to receive a notice of intent to accelerate.181 
While the statement of law in this case appears well founded, this author 
believes the court has misconstrued the applicable note and deed of trust 
provisions. The deed of trust contains the default language that creates the 
uncertainty.182 That provision provided that upon failure to make timely 
payments, if such default continued after notice of the default was given and the 
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cure period had lapsed without cure, then the note could be accelerated.183 This 
opinion confuses the difference between a notice of default with a cure period 
and a notice of intent to accelerate.184 Under the circumstances of this case, a 
notice of default and right to cure should have been sent to the borrower. The 
failure to cure such a default within the applicable time period would have 
caused the default to ripen into an event allowing acceleration. At that time, the 
waiver of notice of intent to accelerate, contained in a separate sentence in the 
default provision of the deed of trust, would have become applicable.185 
Without correcting this distinction, this case could become problematic for a 
lender that, pursuant to its loan documents, having given a notice of default and 
the cure period having elapsed, would be faced with a question of whether a 
waiver of intent to accelerate at that time is applicable or whether an additional 
notice of intent to accelerate is required under the Mathis holding. Hopefully, 
subsequent decisions can clarify the answer to this question. 
IV.  GUARANTIES/INDEMNITIES 
A.  RECOURSE CARVEOUTS 
The issue of recourse carveouts was discussed in Wells Fargo Bank v. Smuck & 
White, a case falling just outside the survey period but important enough to 
include.186 MBS-The Falls, Ltd. obtained a nonrecourse loan that was subject to 
certain nonrecourse carve-outs, which are exceptions to the nonrecourse 
language in a note and which create full or partial liability for the debtor in the 
event of certain occurrences.187 As a loan condition, the lender required two 
principals of the borrower, Smuck and White, to execute a document entitled 
Non-Recourse Indemnification Agreement.188 Upon default, Wells Fargo sued 
the borrower and the two individual indemnitors/guarantors in Tarrant County 
under the non-recourse exceptions, alleging waste and impairment of foreclosure 
rights due to the filing of prohibited liens.189 Wells Fargo obtained an 
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interlocutory summary judgment on its non-recourse claims against the 
borrower, and when that summary judgment became final, Wells Fargo, in a bit 
of clever procedural maneuvering, nonsuited without prejudice its claims against 
the individual guarantors, Smuck and White.190 Then Wells Fargo sued the 
individuals in Harris County under the indemnification agreement, offering 
evidence only of the note, indemnification agreement, and the Tarrant County 
case pleadings and final judgment.191 The Harris County court ruled against 
Wells Fargo.192 The issue on appeal was whether the Tarrant County judgment 
established the basis upon which Smuck and White were liable under the Non-
Recourse Indemnification Agreement.193 
Smuck contended that the indemnity was only applicable to claims brought 
against Wells Fargo by a third party, not as to Wells Fargo’s own losses caused by 
the borrower’s breach.194 The court analyzed the contract language without 
relying on the title of the document.195 The court concluded that the provisions 
clearly encompassed Wells Fargo’s own losses, damages, costs, and expenses, and 
that the indemnification agreement was essentially a guaranty.196 Further, the 
court analyzed the purpose of the document and concluded that provisions 
relating to waste and impairment of rights to foreclose were inconsistent with 
Smuck’s argument that the document only related to third party claims.197 Also, 
the court noted and distinguished other cases relating to the same parties in 
similar financing arrangements.198 Moreover, the court stated that allowing these 
individual indemnitors/guarantors to require Wells Fargo to reprove all of the 
elements for recovery “would amount to allowing an impermissible, collateral 
attack on the Tarrant County Judgment.”199 Wells Fargo either had to prove it 
had obtained the Tarrant County judgment based on the non-recourse 
exceptions or, absent such judgment, prove the non-recourse exceptions; the 
court determined that Wells Fargo had established the Tarrant County 
judgment based on non-recourse exceptions and that the 
indemnitors/guarantors could not attack such judgment since it would be an 
impermissible collateral attack.200 Practitioners are hereby warned that not 
addressing directly any defenses under a non-recourse exceptions provision in a 
note may have adverse consequences on subsequent actions against a guarantor 
who had recourse liability if the borrower/obligor was found to be personally 
liable. 
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B.  FAIR NOTICE DOCTRINE 
The fair notice doctrine for indemnification provisions was addressed in Tutle 
& Tutle Trucking v. EOG Resources.201 While this case related to a personal injury 
rather than real property, the ruling on the indemnification applies to typical 
real estate indemnity provisions. Tutle entered into a master service contract 
with EOG to haul sand to be used for oil and gas well fracking.202 Henderson, 
an employee of Tutle, was assisting a third party, Frack Source, in unloading the 
sand when equipment run by Frack Source, which had been defectively 
modified, caused an injury to Henderson.203 Frack Source demanded EOG 
indemnify it under a separate service contract, and EOG made demand on Tutle 
for defense and indemnity.204 
The master service agreement between EOG and Tutle contained various 
indemnity provisions in paragraphs 6A through 6E.205 Paragraphs 6A and 6B 
were typical broad indemnification provisions between EOG and Tutle, which 
were set forth in capital letters and larger font than the rest of the contract.206 
However, the “pass through provisions” were contained in paragraph 6E, which 
had neither capital letters nor larger font.207 In analyzing the fair notice 
doctrine, the court dismissed the first requirement, being the express negligence 
doctrine, because the facts did not relate to the party’s own negligence.208 This 
left the focus on the conspicuousness requirement.209 Even though the pass 
through paragraph was not capitalized or in a larger font, the court found it was 
conspicuous because (1) the numbering for the paragraph was capitalized, which 
was different from other non-indemnity provisions in the contract; (2) the 
location of the pass through paragraph, being paragraph 6E, was numerically 
linked to paragraphs 6A and 6B, the capitalized and larger font indemnity 
provisions between the two parties; (3) paragraph 6E was not buried within the 
contract or located away from the other indemnity provisions; and (4) it was on 
the same page as part of the other conspicuous indemnity provisions.210 While 
this decision seems, to this author, to be weak on substance, practitioners 
should be aware of the consequences of such provisions, as well as drafting 
requirements needed for conspicuousness. 
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C.  WAIVER OF DEFICIENCY OFFSET 
Interstate 35/Chisam Road, L.P. v. Moayedi considered the effectiveness of 
waiving the Texas deficiency offset statute with broad, generic waiver language 
contained in a guaranty.211 Moayedi executed a guaranty of debt incurred by an 
affiliated entity, which contained broad waivers of defenses.212 Moayedi argued 
that the guaranty waiver provisions were not effective to waive the provisions of 
the Texas deficiency offset statute because such a waiver would frustrate the 
stated purpose of that statute.213 The court rejected Moayedi’s position, 
concluding that the waiver language was “enforceable as a matter of law to waive 
the offset rights” under the Texas deficiency offset statute.214 
First, the court noted that Texas had a strong public policy in favor of 
preserving the freedom of contract under the Texas constitution.215 
Furthermore, the court noted that the legislature had the opportunity but chose 
not to provide that this statute was non-waivable, noting legislative history;216 
two prior cases holding that such statute was waivable;217 and the use of the 
words “any,” “each,” and “every” in the waiver paragraph as being broad, 
conclusive, and conveying the intent that the guaranty would be subject to no 
defenses other than payment.218 Further, four other paragraphs supported its 
conclusion.219 
V.  PURCHASER/SELLER 
A.  LIMITATIONS—DISCOVERY RULE 
Collective Asset Partners, LLC v. McDade addressed the discovery rule allowing 
the extension of the two-year statute of limitation period in a negligent 
misrepresentation case.220 Collective Asset Partners (CAP) acquired property 
from Schaumburg with financing from Legend Bank.221 As part of the financing 
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process, Legend acquired an appraisal that valued the property at $10,250,000 
and noted that it was located in flood zone AE.222 The appraisal specified that it 
was solely for the benefit of Legend Bank and no other parties could rely upon 
it.223 CAP obtained knowledge of the flood zone in connection with and at the 
time of closing by reason of (1) the appraisal’s executive summary that revealed 
the flood zone; (2) the FEMA map showing the property in the flood zone, 
which was received at closing; (3) a survey of the property showing the flood 
plain; and (4) the knowledge imparted to CAP by the execution of two loan 
documents relating to flood zone determination and hazards.224 Based on that 
information, the court held that CAP had sufficient notice to cause a reasonable 
person to inquire further and, therefore, the two year limitation period began to 
run at the date of the original closing, not at the subsequent date when a second 
appraisal obtained by CAP indicated the flood plain.225 
B.  BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY; ATTORNEY’S FEES 
Howard Industries v. Crown Court & Seal Co. addressed whether attorney’s fees 
were applicable to a breach of implied warranty claim.226 Crown bought an 
industrial transformer for its facility.227 When the transformer failed, Crown 
sued the manufacturer, installer, and various distributors for breach of an 
implied warranty of merchantability.228 The sole issue was whether attorney’s 
fees are applicable to a breach of implied warranty claim.229 The court cited the 
general rule that attorney’s fees may be awarded only if authorized by statute or 
contract.230 Here, the breach occurred under the Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC) provision warranting that goods shall be merchantable if implied in a 
sales contract where the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that 
kind.231 The UCC, as a statutory enactment, does not authorize attorney’s fees; 
therefore, the court had to determine whether the Texas Civil Practices and 
Remedies Code allows for attorney’s fees if the claim is based on an oral or 
written contract.232 In analyzing this issue, the court looked at three prior Texas 
Supreme Court cases, concluding that the damages plead generally dictate 
whether the claim is based in contract (with attorney’s fees) or in tort (without 
attorney’s fees).233 The UCC breach of an express warranty claim here was a suit 
on a contract; consequently, when the pleadings alleged pure economic 
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damages, the claim sounded in contract, as opposed to claims alleging damages 
for death or personal injury, which sound in tort.234 This case is noteworthy to 
the practitioner seeking attorney’s fees to be mindful that pleadings should only 
allege economic damages to preserve the claims for attorney’s fees. 
C.  FRAUD AND PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL 
Mavex Management v. Hines Dallas Hotel Ltd. involved the purchase of 
unimproved property with the intention to develop a condominium project.235 
Mavex acquired a one acre lot and a 10.37% interest in an adjacent parking tract 
and parking deck with the intention to develop a multi-story, 126-unit 
condominium tower in the Galleria area of Dallas.236 The property was subject 
to an existing Reciprocal Easement Agreement (REA) limiting the development 
to a hotel.237 The purchase and sale agreement was executed subject to the 
obtainment of an amendment to the REA allowing the condominium 
development.238 Mavex prepared plans for the condominium unit and 
submitted them to the city for site plan approval, as well as to the seller to 
obtain various approvals from the owners of other property under the REA, 
which included the Tower One Tract, Tower Two Tract, and the unimproved 
property being acquired.239 Mavex claimed that it relied upon representations in 
the contract that the condominium could use 252 spaces in the parking garage 
and 57 common use spaces for the condominium center after-hours events.240 
However, at the time of closing, the owners of Tower One Tract and Tower Two 
Tract had made no written assurances regarding the parking spaces.241 While the 
Tower One owner ultimately approved the plans, the Tower Two owner (who 
was the transferee from the original owner) refused to accept the plans.242 Mavex 
sued Hines on fraud and promissory estoppel arguments, but the trial court 
granted summary judgment in favor of Hines.243 
The appellate court noted that the evidence submitted by Mavex, constituting 
primarily an affidavit of its principal, was merely conclusory in nature, not 
having identified with any specificity when the alleged statements were made or 
what specific actions Mavex took in reliance on the statements; therefore, the 
affidavit did not raise fact issue sufficient to defeat the summary judgment.244 
Also, Mavex failed to introduce any proof that statements made by Hines were 
false at the time they were made, which also did not support an attack on the 
summary judgment in favor of Hines.245 While the law in this case is not 
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particularly noteworthy, this case demonstrates the problems encountered when 
important title and development issues are not fully negotiated and documented 
prior to a closing. 
D.  SPECIFIC JURISDICTION 
A long arm jurisdictional issue is presented in Tabacinic v. Frazier.246 
Tabacinic, through a partnership entity, sold Frazier a house for $1,500,000 
with a separate punch list agreement detailing the construction items to be 
completed.247 When the work was not completed and mechanic’s liens surfaced 
against the property, Frazier sued Tabacinic, a resident of Florida.248 Tabacinic 
challenged the jurisdiction of the court, but the appellate court held there were 
sufficient contacts to assert specific jurisdiction over Tabacinic, noting Texas 
courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants pursuant 
to its long arm statute.249 Furthermore, such jurisdiction is allowed under the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution if 
“the nonresident has established minimum contacts with the forum state and 
the exercise of jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.”250 The facts in this case showed that Tabacinic individually 
invested in multiple properties in Dallas, was the individual responsible for 
making all decisions concerning actions of the various corporate entities, and 
signed the purchase and sale agreement and punch list agreement by his 
individual name without indicating any corporate capacity.251 Consequently, the 
court concluded that Frazier established sufficient evidence to assert special 
jurisdiction over Tabacinic.252 The Tabacinic defense of representative capacity 
was deemed insufficient due to the actions noted above taken in a non-
representative capacity.253 
Tabacinic also alleged that a single contract would be insufficient for special 
jurisdiction; the court disagreed, noting that contracts for the purchase or sale of 
Texas property are types of contract that can show a purposeful availment of the 
benefits of the forum jurisdiction.254 By its very nature, a real estate contract 
typically involves many contacts over a long period of time, implying various 
continuing obligations and leaving no doubt of the continuing relationship with 
Texas.255 The court concluded that “the manner in which [Tabacinic] signed the 
contract, coupled with the nature of the contract itself [being a contract covering 
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Texas real property], constitute[d] sufficient[] purposeful contacts to support the 
exercise of [specific] jurisdiction.”256 Further, the court found that the fiduciary 
shield doctrine used in tort cases would be inapplicable in this case because an 
individual committed the alleged tortious actions.257 Finally, the court decided 
that the assertion of jurisdiction over Tabacinic did not violate the fair play and 
substantial justice requirements, noting that litigation in Texas would not be 
unfair or unjust despite the geographical distance, that the property 
owner/purchaser had a significant interest in seeking convenient relief, and that 
Texas had strong interest in adjudicating disputes concerning real property 
within its borders.258 This case brings home the importance that nonresident 
parties carefully document simple representative capacity acts (such as signing) to 
avoid special jurisdiction in Texas. 
E.  FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT DAMAGES; AS IS CLAUSES 
Fazio v. Cypress/GR Houston I, L.P. contains a good discussion of damages 
relating to a fraudulent inducement in the sale of commercial real property.259 
Fazio entered into a purchase agreement with Cypress to acquire a retail site, 
which had as its primary tenant Garden Ridge Pottery.260 During the letter of 
intent stage, Fazio asked for all information in the possession of Cypress 
concerning the property.261 At this time, Garden Ridge was in financial distress, 
which Cypress knew.262 Garden Ridge had written to Cypress indicating it was 
undergoing a corporate restructure and requested a thirty percent rent 
reduction.263 Cypress’s lender had also expressed concern about the financial 
viability of Garden Ridge, even requiring an additional personal guaranty from 
Cypress’s chief executive officer.264 On the other hand, Fazio had undertaken its 
own independent investigation of Garden Ridge, which included reviewing the 
lease terms and Garden Ridge’s audited financial statements, and contacting 
Garden Ridge’s chief financial officer for an assessment of its financial 
condition (who advised Fazio of the restructuring and financial issues facing 
Garden Ridge).265 After such investigations, Fazio executed a purchase 
agreement with Cypress, which contained a fairly typical “as is” clause.266 Within 
a few months, Garden Ridge had defaulted, declared bankruptcy, and rejected 
its lease.267 Fazio could not lease the space and sold the property within three 
years for approximately fifty percent of the original sales price and sued Cypress 
for fraudulent inducement for failing to disclose the financial condition of 
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Garden Ridge.268 The trial court submitted two damage questions to the jury, 
one of which was legally inapplicable.269 The appellate court noted that there 
were “two appropriate measures of direct damages in a fraud case: out-of-pocket 
and benefit-of-the-bargain” damages, both of which are measured at the time of 
the sale induced by the fraud.270 Therefore, the jury instruction on damages that 
asked for the difference between the price Fazio paid for the property and the 
value of the property at the time of acquisition was a proper measure of out of 
pocket damages.271 The noteworthy aspects of this case, however, lie in the 
concurring and dissenting opinions. 
The concurring opinion is written in response to the dissent, which focused 
on the disclaimer of reliance.272 The concurring opinion noted that the 
purchase and sale agreement was a fully integrated written agreement that 
recited that the buyer would “rely solely upon its own investigation with respect 
to the Property, including, without limitation, the Property’s . . . economic 
condition”; that clearly and unequivocally disclaimed the buyer’s reliance on the 
seller’s representations and omissions with respect to the property’s economic 
condition; and that clearly and unequivocally disclaimed the seller’s liability 
with respect to seller’s representations and omissions.273 The initial letter of 
intent was “displaced by and replaced with the terms of the Purchase 
Agreement,” such that the letter of intent was merely a proposal and not 
binding upon the parties until a formal purchase agreement was executed.274 
Numerous provisions in the letter of intent supported this conclusion.275 
Further, the concurring opinion noted the existence of a “merger clause,” which 
indicated that the initial purchase and sale agreement was the entire agreement 
of the parties and not one of multiple agreements (including the letter of intent) 
addressing the transaction.276 The result of the merger clause was to override the 
letter of intent’s due diligence provisions and adopt the detailed inspection 
provisions contained in the purchase and sale agreement.277 The concurring 
opinion also addressed the disclaimer provision, concluding it was a clear and 
unequivocal disclaimer of the borrower’s reliance on the completeness of the 
documentation provided by seller.278 The disclaimer provision was sufficient to 
limit the scope of the seller’s obligations to search for and investigate 
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documents, although it did not affirmatively authorize the seller to misrepresent 
the truth or to knowingly conceal information.279 However, the same provision 
continued with an expressed disclaimer and waiver of any and all liabilities for 
representations and warranties in or omissions from the various documents and 
communications.280 The existence of an “as is” provision was also viewed as 
further evidence that the buyer intended to rely solely on its own 
investigation.281 
Additionally, the concurring opinion discussed recent cases on disclaimer 
provisions, such as Italian Cowboy,282 which did not contain a “clear and 
unequivocal” disclaimer because of “the absence of a disclaimer of reliance” and 
was distinguished from Fazio’s merger provision (based on use of the term “rely” 
and the waiver of “liability” in the disclaimer and “as is” provisions).283 Italian 
Cowboy is in contrast to the other Texas Supreme Court cases of Schlumberger284 
and Forest Oil.285 Each of those cases had an effective disclaimer of reliance with 
language that was clear and unequivocal in expressly disclaiming reliance on 
representations and affirming reliance on one’s own judgment.286 The 
provisions in the “as is” clause in Fazio were similar to the approved disclaimer 
provisions in Schlumberger and Forest Oil in that the buyer agreed to rely solely 
upon its own investigation and waived any and all liabilities arising from such 
representations.287 However, the concurring opinion did not discuss the five 
prong test established by the Texas Supreme Court in Italian Cowboy, which is: 
(1) whether the contract terms were negotiated or boiler plate; (2) whether the 
complaining party was represented by counsel; (3) whether the parties dealt with 
each other at arm’s length; (4) whether the parties were knowledgeable in 
business matters; and (5) whether the release language was clear.288 In this case, 
Fazio was a sophisticated real estate investor (factor 4 above), the release and 
waiver language was clear and unambiguous (factor 5 above), Fazio was able to 
negotiate changes (factor 1 above), and Fazio had the resources to engage 
counsel but voluntarily chose to forego such assistance (factor 2 above); 
therefore, the concurring opinion concluded that the Italian Cowboy’s factors, as 
well as the magnitude of the loan, were sufficient to give effect to the clear 
disclaimer language of the contract.289 
In the lengthy, detailed, vigorous, and authoritative dissent, Justice Evelyn 
Keyes took issue with the damages, apportionment of liability, exemplary 
damages, and the basic fraudulent inducement claims; however, it is the 
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dissent’s focus on the fraudulent inducement claim that is noteworthy.290 The 
crux of the dissent’s argument is two-fold. First, the fraudulent inducement 
occurred at the letter-of-intent stage, which caused the execution of the purchase 
and sale agreement, and second, the “as is” disclaimer and merger clauses are 
not clear and unequivocal waivers as to financial matters rather than property 
conditions.291 
The dissent argued that the fraud in the inducement occurred during the 
letter of intent stage and that the law is well established that a disclaimer of 
reliance does not waive fraud in the inducement.292 Cypress’s withholding of 
vital information concerning Garden Ridge’s financial conditions occurred 
during the letter of intent stage, during which Fazio had requested every piece of 
information held by Cypress.293 The dissent analyzed the exact language in the 
purchase and sale agreement.294 Disclosure requirements of the purchase and 
sale agreement were contained in Section 5.2, entitled “Document Review,” 
which related to the “truth, accuracy or completeness of the [d]ocuments” and 
waived liabilities for “representations or warranties . . . and other matters 
contained in the [d]ocuments.”295 These documents included the lease, survey, 
plans, architectural and engineering reports, service contracts, and permits, all of 
which the dissent characterized as being property due diligence items and 
distinguished from the economic condition of the tenant and property, which 
were covered in the letter of intent.296 Therefore, the language was not clear and 
unequivocal as to waive Cypress’s duty to disclose economic information as 
opposed to the property condition information.297 Similarly, the dissent 
reviewed the “as is” clause and found its terminology related solely to acceptance 
of the property and its physical and environmental conditions.298 Then, as to the 
merger clause, the dissent concluded it could not reasonably be interpreted to 
waive a fraudulent inducement claim.299 Consequently, the dissent concluded 
that there was not clear and unequivocal language disclaiming reliance on 
representations under the disclaimer, “as is,” and merger clauses that would 
effectively waive a fraudulent inducement claim based on the concealment by 
Cypress of relevant economic information concerning the tenant Garden 
Ridge.300 
Based on its analysis of the narrowly construed disclaimer, “as is,” and merger 
clauses, the dissent addressed whether there was a duty to disclose that was a 
condition precedent.301 A duty to disclose was applicable under Texas law in a 
number of instances, such as when a partial disclosure conveys a false 
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impression, as noted by the dissent, citing Bradford and JSC Neftegas-Impex.302 
Based on this analysis, the dissent concluded that Cypress had a common law 
and contractual duty to provide the economic information it concealed.303 
The majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions reflect the continuing 
problems courts have in fraudulent inducement cases with the interpretation of 
(and practitioners have in drafting) the disclaimer, “as is,” and merger clauses. 
These authors have reported on numerous other similar cases in prior years’ 
review.304 Clear, concise, and detailed provisions on the nature and scope of 
such clauses will hopefully provide the practitioner with the intended results. 
VI.  LEASES; LANDLORD/TENANT 
The courts also revisited the Italian Cowboy decision in a leasing context in 
Dragon Fish, LLC v. Santikos Legacy, Ltd. and found the following clause sufficient 
to disclaim reliance: 
Reliance. LANDLORD AND TENANT HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE 
THAT THEY ARE NOT RELYING UPON ANY BROCHURE, 
RENDERING, INFORMATION, REPRESENTATION OR PROMISE 
OF THE OTHER, OR AN AGENT OR BROKER, IF ANY, EXCEPT AS 
MAY BE EXPRESSLY SET FORTH IN THIS LEASE.305 
As in Fazio, the court conducted an extensive analysis of the Schlumberger and 
Forest Oil decisions, together with Italian Cowboy, and found the disclaimer 
language here was sufficient, clear, and unequivocal.306 Particularly in this case, 
the parties negotiated the terms of the contract; the tenants were represented by 
counsel; the parties dealt with each other at arm’s length; and the parties were 
knowledgeable in business matters.307 And, again, the disclaimer language was 
clear.308 Accordingly, a claim for fraudulent inducement did not lie.309 
A guaranty also existed where the guarantor guaranteed “the ‘payment and 
performance of all liabilities, obligations and duties’ ‘imposed upon Tenant 
under the terms of the Lease as if Guarantor had executed the Lease as Tenant 
thereunder.’”310 With this clause in place, the guarantor was bound by the 
provisions in the lease, as those terms were incorporated into the guaranty.311 
Similarly, in Futerfas Family Partners v. Griffin, it was a fact question as to whether 
a change to a lease was a material alteration injuring or enhancing the risk of 
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injury to a guarantor, thereby releasing the guarantor.312 
Ashford Partners, Ltd. v. Eco Resources, Inc. reminds us that an assignee of the 
owner takes on the obligations of the landlord, which in this case included 
construction and finish out of an interior space.313 Also of interest, the measure 
of damages was the difference between the agreed rental and the reasonable 
cash-market value of the leasehold, not the cost of remedying the defects.314 The 
cost of property repair would not compensate the lessee for the difference 
between the condition of the lease premises as promised and the actual value—
that is, the benefit of the bargain.315 
A number of the cases provided guidance in drafting. In Parkway Dental 
Associates, P.A. v. Ho & Huang Properties, L.P., an original landlord-developer had 
agreed with a tenant to not allow a competing dental operation in the shopping 
center.316 A portion of the property was then sold, and a new tenant leased space 
inside the premises now owned by another.317 The sale documents, deed, and 
new lease had no competing tenant clause, and the new tenant started a dental 
operation.318 The earlier tenant could not prevent this business because no 
prohibition existed in the new lease.319 Thus, the original landlord may have 
been in violation of and in breach of its original lease agreement, but the new 
partial owner and tenant were not.320 The lesson learned is that counsel should 
take care to review existing leases and non-compete provisions in connection 
with the sale of a portion of a larger property. Thorough drafting could have 
prevented this problem. 
Another decision by the Austin Court of Appeals is of interest because of its 
discussion of the Texas Uniform Unincorporated Non-Profit Association Act 
(TUUNAA), which rarely shows up in the case law.321 In M.T. Falcon Investments, 
LLC v. Chisolm Trail Elks Lodge, an association had taken steps to comply with 
TUUNAA.322 The court found that such an association was a distinct entity, 
with the members and agents not liable for the association’s actions.323 A 
landlord who rented commercial space to the association formed under 
TUUNAA could not seek damages for breach of a lease agreement against the 
individuals.324 This case clearly demonstrates the value of TUUNAA to clubs, 
loose associations, and other similar groups. 
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A number of cases dealt with forcible detainer actions. In Fontaine v. Deutsch 
Bank National Trust Co., the foreclosure purchaser challenged an existing 
tenant’s rights under the Protecting Tenants from Foreclosure Act of 2009 
(PTFA).325 The only available precedent, which was non-binding, indicated that 
a foreclosure purchaser carried the burden to demonstrate that a lease was not 
bona fide.326 This federal act was passed during the recession to protect tenants 
and provide at least a ninety-day notice for termination of certain leases in the 
event of a foreclosure, if the leases were indeed bona fide.327 Tenants have 
utilized the PTFA to protect their possession of property many times since its 
enactment.328 However, parties should remember that this act, found at 12 
U.S.C. § 5220, sunseted on December 13, 2014.329 
Several cases also revisited the jurisdictional question for a Justice Court—
always a headache for the courts. The Justice Court has authority to determine 
right of possession but does not have jurisdiction to determine title.330 As simple 
as that may seem, the issues are often intertwined and difficult to determine. 
In Pina v. Pina, the Justice Court did not have jurisdiction because there was a 
title dispute between family members and the right of possession could not be 
determined without resolution of that title question.331 There was a deed from 
the now deceased mother to the sisters, which the sons contended was obtained 
by fraud.332 With a somewhat contrary approach, the Court of Appeals in Dallas 
in Lugo v. Ross confirmed the right to determine possession, even though the 
tenants argued that they had an option agreement that permitted them to obtain 
title.333 The tenants had attempted to exercise the purchase option but there was 
a dispute over that exercise.334 No closing had taken place.335 The court found 
that such a claim had to be decided in a separate court with jurisdiction, but at 
the present time, there was no title dispute to be resolved, and the owner was 
entitled to his eviction.336 
In another case, which highlights a developing defense and one for which we 
can only hope the courts exercise restraint, the party in possession raised a claim 
of adverse possession.337 The court found that “the county court, in considering 
the pleadings before it, would have had to determine title to the property in 
order to determine whether the [Plaintiff] had a superior right to possession.”338 
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The concern here of course is that any tenant might assert adverse possession as 
a defense thereby taking jurisdiction away from the Justice Court.339 Hopefully, 
the courts will review the circumstances and limit the application, particularly if 
there is or was a lease in place and the party was clearly initially in possession as 
a tenant. 
VII.  CONSTRUCTION MATTERS 
The survey period included a number of construction cases, most of which 
are limited to their facts or procedures, but there were a few warranting 
attention. First, in Jewelry Manufacturer’s Exchange, Inc. v. Tafoya, an original 
subcontractor was not entitled to fund trap dollars to be paid to a new 
subcontractor hired to replace that original subcontractor when it stopped 
work.340 Under the facts of this case, Tafoya was an electrical subcontractor that 
stopped work at about 80% of completion.341 The general contractor hired a 
replacement contractor who completed the work.342 Tafoya sought to fund trap 
against payments being paid to the new contractor.343 However, the court found 
that the original contractor was not authorized to withhold funds from the 
replacement contractor who had no relationship to the contractor it had 
replaced.344 
The Dallas Court of Appeals also somewhat eroded the Certificate of Merit 
Statute by prohibiting a construction defect case for negligence but allowing it as 
a breach of contract, even in the absence of a certificate of merit.345 In JJW 
Development, LLC v. Strand Systems Engineering, Inc., the court found that Texas 
Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 150.002, in effect in 2008, required a 
certificate of merit to bring a claim based on professional services.346 This case 
involved the design of a concrete foundation.347 The court limited the affidavit 
requirement to claims for negligence and not for contract, noting that an action 
in contract is for the breach of an either expressed or implied duty arising under 
the contract, while an action in tort is for the breach of a duty imposed by 
law.348 A contractual relationship can create duties under both contract law and 
tort law.349 However, in such a case, “the nature of the injury most often 
determines which duty or duties are breached. When the injury is only the 
economic loss to the subject of the contract itself, the action sounds in contract 
alone.”350 In this case, the allegations were not that the services were performed 
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improperly, but that they were not performed at all as required by the 
contract.351 Moreover, repair costs and diminution in value were determined to 
be the benefit-of-the-bargain or economic-loss damages,352 indicating a breach of 
contract. The court found that a certificate of merit was not required for a claim 
for tortious interference.353 
A similar analysis can be found in Retherford v. Castro, dealing with the 
professional services exception under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act 
(DTPA).354 This case is important in that it finds that a professional home 
inspector licensed by the Texas Real Estate Commission is a professional 
excepted from liability under the DTPA.355 Thus, no DTPA claim can be 
brought against the individual because the essence of the service was providing 
advice, judgment, or opinion based on specialized knowledge or training.356 The 
professional real estate inspector was not exempted under the above referenced 
Certificate of Merit Statute but did qualify under § 17.49(c) of the DTPA.357 
However, the exemption was not available for a negligent misrepresentation 
claim, which the court remanded for further consideration.358 
Two more cases also dealt with subcontractors. In Yost v. Jered Custom Homes, 
a homeowner who had suffered a loss of the home due to foreclosure still had 
standing to assert claims against the builder for negligence and breach of 
implied warranties of habitability and of good and workmanlike construction.359 
The homeowner may have been harmed by a reduction in the home’s sale price 
at foreclosure.360 
Also, in Courtland Building Company, Inc. v. Jalal Family Partnership, Ltd., a 
contractor had a right to compel arbitration to resolve a dispute involving a 
subcontractor’s performance and property owned by a partnership, even though 
not all of the partners had executed the building contract that included the 
arbitration clause.361 The court applied a doctrine of “direct benefits estoppel” 
to compel arbitration because the non-signatory party sought to derive a direct 
benefit from the contract that contained the arbitration clause.362 
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VIII.  TITLE MATTERS 
A.  ADVERSE POSSESSION/TITLE DISPUTES 
In a case that dealt with the area of public roads and implied dedication, the 
El Paso Court of Appeals found that a dirt road that ran through the property 
had been impliedly dedicated for public use.363 In McCulloch v. Brewster County, 
the dispute originated when the county designated Mills Road as a county road 
on its county road map.364 The plaintiffs timely filed a challenge to that 
designation within the statutorily required two year period.365 In particular, the 
plaintiffs sought a Declaratory Judgment that Mills Road was a private road.366 
Implied dedication involves the landowner causing the public to believe that he 
planned to dedicate the road to public use; that he was legally capable to 
dedicate it; that the public acted upon that belief and will benefit from the 
dedication; and that the landowner offered and the public accepted the 
dedication.367 Permitting a governmental authority “to grade, repair, improve, or 
fence off the roadway” may establish donative intent, but even a “long and 
continued use of the disputed road by the public raises a presumption of 
dedication.”368 In this case, older maps showed the road, and the county had 
maintained the road. Of particular interest in this case is that the origin of the 
road was “shrouded in obscurity” and there was evidence of “long and 
continued use of the road by the public.”369 This created a presumption that the 
land owner intended to dedicate the road to the public.370 
In one adverse possession case worthy of note, Blaylock v. Holland, the Texas 
courts’ general disregard for fences did not play out.371 The construction of a 
chain link fence began the running of limitations, but suit was filed just prior to 
the ten year period.372 Earlier activity when the fence did not exist was 
insufficient to create notice of an assertion of a hostile claim to the property.373 
Also, the question of trespass-to-title-versus-declaratory-judgment causes of 
action continues to be an issue for the courts. A declaratory judgment action is 
often more attractive to a plaintiff because it provides a basis to obtain attorney’s 
fees.374 Trespass to try title does not permit recovery of attorney’s fees, as has 
been discussed in previous survey issues, although there are limited 
circumstances permitting it under the adverse possession statutes involving a 
dispossession.375 In Richmond v. T.N. Wells, a declaratory judgment action was 
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appropriate to interpret a deed.376 The court further noted that “generally, non-
possessory interests are not proper subjects for a trespass-to-try-title action.”377 
Moreover, the court touched on the question of actual notice by possession 
since, in this case, there was a lack of constructive notice, and it found that the 
existence of a pump jack did not put a grantee on notice of any interest claimed 
by a third party.378 
Vernon v. Perrien is another instance where the court distinguishes the 
declaratory judgment from a trespass-to-try-title action by noting that a trespass-
to-try-title action is statutory and relies on the superior title of the plaintiff.379 “A 
suit to quiet title relies on the invalidity of the defendant’s claim to the 
property,” the effect of which is to declare invalid or ineffective a defendant’s 
claim to title.380 
In Wilhoite v. Sims, the court of appeals found a declaratory judgment action 
appropriate to cancel a deed that was voidable as opposed to requiring a trespass-
to-try-title action.381 “A suit for cancellation of a deed [was] an assertion of an 
equitable title” and was “not a claim of right to title and possession of [the] real 
property.”382 In this case, during the pendency of a divorce, the wife had 
attempted to transfer by quitclaim her one-half interest in the property.383 
Finally, in the category of “no good deed goes unpunished,” a property owner 
that had maintained a small family cemetery that was not his family’s was 
precluded from arguing that the cemetery was an “abandoned cemetery” under 
Health and Safety Code § 711.010(b).384 This prevented the property owner 
from relocating the cemetery to assist with oil and gas operations and from 
seeking removal (or permitting exhumation) to transfer the human remains to a 
perpetual cemetery.385 
B.  DEEDS AND CONVEYANCES 
Several cases dealt with legal descriptions, including compliance with the 
Statute of Frauds. In one case, an appellate court considered the issue of a road 
dedicated to public use that stated it was one hundred feet wide but also 
provided that the dedication was subject to the condition that the curb line on 
the road would be fifteen feet inside the street line.386 In effect, this limited the 
roadway to seventy feet.387 At the same time, the dedication as a roadway did not 
state an easement for other than roadway purposes, and the thirty-foot space was 
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not available for use, even for the public benefit, when it was inconsistent with 
the dedication.388 The Supreme Court of Texas in reversed the decision in State 
v. NICO—WF1, LLC.389 The court found that the dedication of an easement as a 
public right of way could not carry private restrictions that impaired the state’s 
control and public use of the dedicated street.390 A dedication of land for public 
use may include reasonable restrictions and limitations, but those limitations 
cannot be repugnant to the dedication or against public policy.391 Rather than 
declare the entire grant as ineffective, the court sustained the dedication and 
found the condition ineffective.392 In this case, then, a building that encroached 
several feet into the 100-foot right of way could be removed by the state.393 For 
those seeking to expand their vocabulary, the encroachment was a “purpresture” 
or “an appropriation to private use to that which belongs to the public.”394 
In El Dorado Land Company, L.P. v. City of McKinney, a property conveyed to 
the city included a reversionary interest in the event that the land was used for 
anything other than a community park.395 When the city violated the restriction, 
statutory immunity included an inability to force the city to re-grant.396 The 
court treated the reverter as a conditional future interest.397 Thus, while the 
dedicating grantor could not cause a reverter, it did have a right to seek 
compensation for the inverse condemnation.398 
The Court of Appeals for El Paso took a somewhat similar approach in Singer 
v. State.399 Two donation deeds to the State of Texas for public highway 
purposes included a reverter clause in the event that the land was not used for 
public highway purposes on or before January 1, 2000.400 The grantors in this 
case did take steps to assert inverse condemnation.401 The state argued that the 
language of the deeds created a condition subsequent, which, having been 
satisfied, though late, could not result in the automatic reversion and revestment 
of title.402 A condition subsequent is language designating an event upon which 
the grantor has the power to terminate the grantee’s interest.403 The grantor 
must take steps to reenter or take an equivalent action to terminate the grantee’s 
estate.404 “A possibility of reverter is ‘a future interest retained by a grantor after 
conveying a fee simple determinable, so that the grantee’s estate terminates 
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automatically and reverts to the grantor if the terminating event ever occurs.’”405 
The court indicated that there were no specific words that controlled, but 
rather, the key was the intent at the time of the grant.406 Language such as 
“while,” “during,” “until,” or “so long as” typically establish an intent to create a 
fee simple determinable.407 Phrases such as “upon condition that,” “provided 
that,” “but if,” or “if it happens that” create a condition subsequent.408 The 
deeds in question, even though they utilize a reference to reversion, did not 
specifically contain automatic reversion language.409 Because the language in the 
deeds was unclear as to whether it created a condition subsequent or a 
possibility of reverter, any doubt was to be resolved in favor of a condition 
subsequent.410 In addition, the deed used traditional fee simple absolute 
language, including “grant, give and convey” and a habendum clause that used 
the words, “to have and to hold the premises herein described and herein 
conveyed unto the State of Texas and its assigns forever.”411 
As a condition subsequent, because some activity had already begun by 
January 1, 2000, the court found that the grantors had failed to establish a right 
to title.412 The grantors failed to timely reenter or take equivalent action to 
terminate the state’s interest.413 This case is a bit frightening in that it would 
appear the grantors generally intended for the property to return to them if not 
timely used for public highway purposes. The case demonstrates the effort to 
which the courts will go to protect public interests and to avoid finding a 
reverter. Any attorney drafting a deed to include a reverter, particularly when 
dealing with a public entity, should go to great lengths to set out the reversion 
and to make it clear that it is not a fee simple absolute and the grant is subject to 
reverter, ipso facto, without requiring the grantor to take any further action. 
In Ardmore, Inc. v. Rex Group, Inc., a description of the property that identified 
three sides with the fourth side being a line on an attached map was sufficient to 
describe the property.414 This case was in a leasing context, but the court found 
that there was no distinction between determining an adequate legal description 
under deeds or a leasing instrument.415 The map of a larger tract under lease was 
attached as an exhibit in support of a purchase option.416 However, note that in 
May v. Buck, 100 acres centered on a point was an inadequate description.417 
Obviously, a 100-acre shape with a center point could be not only a circle, but 
also a square or even an irregular shape with a center point. The use of acreage 
to describe a legal description is rarely adequate because acreage is only a 
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measure of area. 
In another case, Hahn v. Love, the court of appeals in Houston again 
confirmed that the use of a tax ID number and a street address can be a 
sufficient legal description for purposes of conveying real property.418 This case 
includes an interesting discussion of the judgment liens and their duration, and 
of the renewal and dormancy of a judgment.419 This is an area often confused, 
and the court does an excellent job of separating a judgment, a writ of 
execution, and a dormancy from the lien created by an abstract of judgment 
under Texas Property Code Chapter 52.420 No lien exists under a judgment 
until it is abstracted, recorded, and indexed.421 In this case, the judgment debtor 
purchased property to which a judgment lien attached, but during the debtor’s 
ownership, the judgment lien expired.422 The judgment also became dormant 
for failure to issue a new writ of execution within ten years of its initial 
issuance.423 When the application was filed to revive the judgment, a deed was 
recorded before the judgment could be revived and a new judgment lien 
abstracted.424 However, subsequent to all of these events, a correction deed was 
filed to deal with the possible inadequate legal description noted above.425 The 
judgment creditor argued that this was evidence that the first deed was void for 
lack of an adequate legal description and that the correction deed put a 
subsequent purchaser on notice of the second judgment lien.426 The court 
found that this was not the case, that the first deed was adequate, and that the 
second judgment lien came too late.427 Further, the court found that the 
correction deed was outside the chain of title and did not excite inquiry.428 
Again, note that the court found that a subsequent correction deed in 2004 
to add a proper legal description was not relevant since the earlier deed was 
adequate and that it was outside the chain of title.429 This last finding is subject 
to some question since the statutory scheme for correction instruments indicates 
that they do “replace and substitute” for the original deed.430 It also highlights 
some of the problems with current correction instrument legislation and 
indexing by the county clerks, which remains an issue for real property records 
and the county clerk’s filing systems. It may well require the legislature to fix 
Texas Local Government Code §§ 193.003(a), (b) and 193.005. 
More evidence of drafting lessons can be found in a number of 2012 Texas 
cases. Similar to Hahn, an exception for a riverbed acreage was sufficient to 
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except the property from a conveyance.431 In Hunsaker v. Brown Distributing Co., 
the terminology “now owned by grantor” referred to the fractional interest 
owned by the grantor so that the 1/2 conveyance resulted in the grantor 
conveying 1/2 of his interest instead of his entire 1/4 interest.432 Finally, Arco 
Petroleum Corp. v. BNW Property Co. and Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. v. BNW 
Property Co. demonstrated that an executive right follows a conveyance of 
minerals unless expressly reserved.433 
Also worth mentioning, the Texarkana Court of Appeals in Champion v. 
Robinson pointed out the presumption in favor of partitioning property in kind 
as opposed to partitioning by sale.434 The court further presumed that minerals 
are equally distributed throughout a property unless there is a showing to the 
contrary.435 In this case, there were numerous property interests in irregular 
sized properties and partition in kind was simply not appropriate.436 
C.  EASEMENTS 
The Eastland Court of Appeals provides a good discussion of various 
easements in its decision in Harrington v. Dawson–Conway Ranch, Ltd.437 The case 
itself is a reversal of a summary judgment granted to the dominant estate to the 
north.438 The court reviewed, in particular, two theories of easements, by 
prescription and by necessity.439 The court disregarded the possibility of an 
implied easement appurtenant because it was not pleaded.440 To find an 
easement by necessity, the key points were that the necessity had to be a strict 
necessity, existing both at the time of severance and continuing at the present 
date.441 Here, the dominant estate failed to prove that the necessity was 
continuing.442 
The easement by prescription was also not available because the parties had 
jointly used the road, and such a use could not ripen into an easement by 
prescription.443 The court spent significant time discussing the Scott v. Cannon 
case, which created a very limited exception to the exclusivity requirement for 
road usage.444 It noted, specifically, that in Scott there was a dispute over a right 
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to use the road.445 The dominant estate had filed an affidavit claiming the road 
as a public road, had maintained and improved the road, and had performed 
other independent acts that were distinct and positive assertions of a right to use 
the road.446 
The Eastland Court of Appeals again dealt with easements, this time with one 
that was written. In McKenna v. Caldwell, the granting party had reserved an 
easement “for purposes of providing a perpetual free, uninterrupted and 
unobstructed easement for access, ingress and egress to and from [the 
property].”447 The fight was over the right to place a cattle guard and to install a 
gate across the property line.448 Because the language was ambiguous as to these 
items, the court found a fact question for the jury.449 Whether the language of 
the easement allowed for a gate or cattle guard depended on the intent of the 
parties.450 For attorneys drafting easements to be reserved or granted, the 
Eastland Court directed attention to Knight v. Buckbrier, where easements were 
found to be unambiguous.451 The easements in that case “specifically stated no 
barriers of any kind were to be erected, other than two gates already in existence, 
that would interfere with the free flow of access.”452 The court did note that 
most cattle guards would not be considered an interruption or obstruction, yet 
still returned the entire question back to the trial court for submission to the 
jury.453 
D.  RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, CONDOMINIUMS, AND OWNERS’ ASSOCIATION 
Two cases highlight the potential dilemma to a developer of real property that 
seeks to retain the minerals. If the developer does not hold 100% of the 
minerals but does hold the executive rights, it may well find itself in a fiduciary 
quandry. The holder of the executive rights has a fiduciary duty to other mineral 
interests to develop the minerals, while the developer may desire to protect the 
real estate development from any oil and gas exploration and development, 
often through the use of restrictive covenants.454 In Friddle v. Fisher, the existence 
of this dilemma and the fiduciary duty created a fact question for the jury.455 
Likewise, the Ft. Worth Court of Appeals found a fact question as to breach of 
duty in Bradshaw v. Steadfast Financial, LLC.456 The Bradshaw case also involved 
issues of self-dealing in connection with structuring bonus payments and 
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royalties.457 
E.  HOMESTEAD 
There were not many case developments in the area of homestead during the 
survey period, but one case out of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in the Western 
District of Texas should draw some attention.458 In this case, the Chapter 7 
trustee objected to the debtor’s homestead exemption, as did a judgment 
creditor, because the judgment resulted from a violation of Texas securities laws 
that was not dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19).459 The Bankruptcy 
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) caps a 
“debtor’s homestead exemption for certain violations of federal or state 
securities laws.”460 The interesting aspect of this case arises because the debtor’s 
non-filing spouse had her own business that provided income for the support of 
the family.461 The case spends much time talking about valuation and income 
but the most interesting part is the court’s handling of the determination to sell 
the homestead because it exceeded the BAPCPA cap.462 The court declined to 
allow the non-debtor spouse to assert a separate homestead exemption for the 
homestead property.463 
Community property and jointly owned property are part of the bankruptcy 
estate even if only one spouse files for bankruptcy.464 However, the court 
determined that the non-filing spouse does not have an independent interest in 
the homestead so as to stack the caps.465 On the other hand, had both husband 
and wife filed as joint debtors they would have been entitled to claim a stacking 
of the homestead exemptions.466 Most troubling though, the court followed Kim 
and indicated that not only could the non-debtor not claim an exemption but 
that “[t]here is also no provision for compensation for the non-filing spouse’s 
property interest.”467 Not even the Internal Revenue Service in seeking to 
enforce a federal tax lien against one spouse enjoys that benefit.468 
The court’s analysis would appear flawed in that it failed to give any respect to 
the community property or homestead interest of the non-debtor spouse, 
whether through handling sale proceeds or through allowing an exemption. 
How would the court have determined the case if both spouses were debtors or 
if the spouses were tenants in common? The court seems to reach a conclusion 
that makes no difference whether the property was community or separate and, 
again, gives a judgment creditor even more rights than the federal government 
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would have in pursuing a federal tax lien.469 
F.  TITLE INSURANCE 
Hahn v. Love, discussed previously regarding deeds and legal descriptions, also 
includes a thorough discussion regarding title insurance examination and 
imputed knowledge to the parties.470 This case involved claims of fraudulent 
transfer, and the plaintiff sought to defeat the bona-fide-purchaser position 
taken by the purchaser.471 The court repeated the basic premise that the title 
company searches for its own benefit in issuing a title insurance policy and has 
no duty to examine title or disclose what it may or may not find.472 Most 
importantly, “an examination is not undertaken for the prospective grantee or 
lienholder to whom the policy will finally issue,” and any information 
discovered by the title company was not imputed to the purchaser.473 The title 
company had no duty to even disclose what it might find in its examination, 
potentially adverse or not.474 
IX.  MISCELLANEOUS 
A.  NUISANCE/TRESPASS 
During the survey period a very good discussion of nuisance and trespass was 
authored by the Tyler Court of Appeals in Mathis v. Barnes.475 This case involved 
flooding caused by a neighbor’s construction of a road.476 The situation arose 
from two adjoining rural properties with a creek running through them.477 The 
plaintiff was upstream and had sought to cultivate “pristine wetlands” on a 
portion of his property.478 The property was a “watering, nesting, and roosting 
place for waterfowl” and had “only limited seasonal fluctuation” due to 
“multiple beaver dams” and other natural effects.479 The property downstream 
was used mostly as pastureland, and the owner constructed a road across the 
property “so that he could more easily access the back pasture.”480 However, this 
“road . . . effectively served as a dam where it crossed [the creek].”481 This 
dam/road caused water to rise upstream.482 The downstream owner sought to 
install culverts to address some of the problem, but, during a flood, the road 
washed away and the water level on the upstream property significantly 
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retreated.483 In essence, the beavers and other natural circumstances had 
adjusted to the road/dam, but the water was gone once the situation was out of 
kilter.484 The upstream owner asserted a nuisance and trespass among other 
claims.485 
The court noted that “[a] nuisance is a condition that substantially interferes 
with the use and enjoyment of land by causing unreasonable discomfort or 
annoyance to persons of ordinary sensibilities attempting to use and enjoy it.”486 
A determination of the nuisance depends upon the “kind of damage done, 
rather than any particular type of conduct.”487 Of note, the downstream owner 
raised the “feral hog defense,” among other things, and the jury found that the 
flooding was not such that it was a nuisance.488 There was also disputed 
evidence as to whether the beavers would return to repair the dams to return the 
property to its wetland condition.489 
With the respect to trespass, the court defined it as an “unauthorized entry 
upon the land of another.”490 Again, the jury agreed with the downstream owner 
that no damage was done, even though a trespass may have occurred by reason 
of the waters being forced back upstream.491 Possibly the jury in this case was 
not very sympathetic to the upstream owner and the case turns on its facts, but 
the discussion of nuisance and trespass is useful. It also brings to life the “feral 
hog defense.”492 
B.  PREMISES LIABILITY 
In the area of premises liability, the Houston Court of Appeals for the 14th 
District rendered a very “tough” decision in yet another case that proves the old 
adage of “no good deed goes unpunished.” In Plunket v. Nall, the homeowners 
held a New Year’s Eve party.493 The homeowners advised guests that anyone 
remaining at midnight was to spend the entire night at the home.494 This action 
was to help ensure that “no party guest drove while intoxicated.”495 Thus, the 
homeowners took on a duty not otherwise imposed under Texas law.496 The 
homeowners took no steps to enforce the rule in that they did not retain car 
keys or take any other action to prevent guests from leaving.497 Of course, a 
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guest and his girlfriend attempted to leave at 2 a.m. and an accident occurred.498 
Accordingly, while no social host liability might exist, a cause of action for 
negligence for the assumed duty survived a motion for summary judgment.499 
In other cases dealing with premises liability, the San Antonio Court of 
Appeals in Dietz v. Hill Country Restaurants, Inc. found no evidence that uneven 
pebbles and concrete in an aggregate walkway posed an unreasonable risk of 
harm or that the owner was on notice.500 In City of Dallas v. Prado, the Dallas 
Court of Appeals found that liability under the Texas Tort Claims Act required 
actual knowledge of a premises defect.501 Moreover, in Dow Chemical Company v. 
Abutahoun the court pointed out that Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 
95.003 requires actual knowledge in the area of owner liability to a contractor’s 
employees.502 
C.  BROKERS 
With respect to the Texas Finance Code § 156.406(b), commonly referred to 
as the Broker Licensing Requirements, a lender/mortgagee did not have 
standing as “an aggrieved person” to seek recovery against an unlicensed 
broker.503 In order to be an “aggrieved person” with standing to assert a cause of 
action under this section of the Finance Code, it is necessary that the person 
directly paid the brokerage fee to the unlicensed broker.504 In Dohalick v. Moody 
National Bank, the bank advanced loan funds to a borrower who then used those 
loan proceeds to pay the brokerage fee.505 This was not a direct payment but 
rather a payment by the borrower, even though it used loan proceeds to make 
the payment.506 Note also that in this case there were no lender instructions 
requiring the use of the proceeds to make such a payment.507 
D.  WATER RIGHTS 
The Texas Supreme Court dealt with the interpretation and application of 
the Open Beaches Act to easements for public beachfront access.508 In Severance 
v. Patterson, the case dealt with whether or not a “rolling” public beachfront 
access easement existed under Texas law.509 Along the Gulf Coast, there exist 
two easements: 
 
 498. Id. 
 499. Id. at 588–89. 
 500. Dietz v. Hill Country Rests., Inc., 398 S.W.3d 761, 767 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no 
pet.). 
 501. City of Dallas v. Prado, 373 S.W.3d, 848, 853 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.) 
(discussing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 101.021(2), 101.022(a) (West 2011)). 
 502. Dow Chemical Co. v. Abutahoun, 395 S.W.3d 335, 343 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. 
denied). 
 503. Dohalick v. Moody Nat’l Bank, 375 S.W.3d 537, 540–41 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 
Dist.] 2012, no pet.). 
 504. Id. at 541. 
 505. Id. at 539. 
 506. Id. at 543. 
 507. See id. at 544. 
 508. Severance v. Patterson, 370 S.W.3d 705, 713 (Tex. 2012). 
 509. Id. 
2014] Real Property 145 
(1) The first one extends from low tide to high tide. This is land that is 
always public and reserved to the state. It is often referred to as a 
“wet” beach. 
(2) The second more difficult easement is the “dry” beach that extends 
from high tide to the mean vegetation line.510 
This second easement only exists if retained by the state initially or if an 
easement has been granted to the state by a private landowner.511 In the case of 
the west beach of Galveston Island, the state had not retained a dry beach 
easement but had obtained certain easements from private interests.512 As 
boundaries along the ocean change due to slow erosion or accretion, the 
easement may slightly move.513 These changes are typically gradual and 
imperceptible.514 However, avulsive events such as storms and hurricanes can 
drastically alter preexisting boundaries.515 This was the case with Hurricane 
Rita.516 
The question then arose as to whether or not the easement rolled forward 
onto the beach due to significant changes in the high tide and vegetative line.517 
In this case, a rolling easement would have placed Ms. Severance’s home in the 
public beach access easement and permitted the state to remove the home.518 
The Texas Supreme Court held that a public beachfront dry easement did not 
roll forward, and the public accordingly lost any interest in the privately owned 
dry beach.519 In other words, the easement did not migrate or roll landward to 
encumber other parts of the parcel as a result of an avulsive event.520 Thus, while 
the public has an important interest in the enjoyment of Texas public beaches, 
the right to exclude others from privately owned realty is a fundamental right 
possessed by private property owners.521 A taking of Ms. Severance’s property 
would have resulted in a taking in violation of the 5th Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.522 Note, however, the wet beach is always public property and 
owners like Ms. Severance can lose improvements if the mean high tide line 
captures it.523 To the contrary, in the event of avulsive action, where the public 
once had access across a “dry” beach public easement, there may now be no 
public access.524 Thus, a public “wet” easement may, in realty, become a private 
beach.525 
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X.  CONCLUSION 
As would be expected following an economic downturn, there were 
significant numbers of cases addressing foreclosure issues; unfortunately, some 
of these decisions were wrongly decided. Decisions regarding the standing of a 
property owner to challenge the legal authority of assignees of the mortgage were 
cogently addressed and confirmed in Homecomings Financial.526 This concept, 
while not directly addressed, was supported by the decision in Cowin.527 On the 
other hand, the Marsh decision, while adequately addressing the “robo signer” 
issues regarding proof of authority to execute documentation, added to the 
confusion on standing of a property owner to challenge mortgage assignments 
by concluding just the opposite from Homecomings Financial.528 Hopefully, future 
case law will clarify this matter. 
As is normally the case, a number of cases reflect the importance in careful 
drafting of documentation. In Garcia, practitioners are warned to draft escrow 
provisions to distinguish between the duty to obtain or renew insurance as 
opposed to the mere payment of premiums therefor.529 Clear documentation of 
the representative capacity in which an individual signs was lacking in and 
determinative of jurisdiction in Tabacinic.530 The drafting and interpretation of 
reliance provisions, “as-is” clauses, and merger clauses continue to prove thorny 
for both the practitioner (in drafting) and the courts (in interpretation and 
enforcement). Fazio presents an excellent analysis of such difficulties in the 
majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions.531 
While the courts revisited, defined, and clarified a number of areas, such as 
FED jurisdiction, declaratory judgments, roads and easements, and water rights, 
they also created confusion and concern in some other areas. Most of this was 
motivated by protection of the state or the attempt to avoid what was perceived 
as an inequitable result. The protective requirements of a certificate of merit and 
other protections provided to professionals were somewhat eroded, and the 
court stretched to turn reverters into conditions subsequent and sustain legal 
descriptions. Also, concerns that may require legislative action arose in the areas 
of homestead rights in bankruptcy and the use of correction deeds. Finally, land 
use planners should also be very aware of the legal dilemma that may arise for 
the developer seeking to avoid mineral exploration and development but who at 
the same time holds the executive rights, which results in a fiduciary duty to 
other mineral interests.532 
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